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Pass-Through Effects of Standing Facilities
on Bank Interest Rates in Nigeria

Eleam, V. E., Ekwom, C. G., Ariolu, C. C., Umebali, C. J., and Balogun, A. T.
Abstract
The paper investigates the pattern of pass-through effects of standing facilities rates on
commercial bank retail interest rates in Nigeria. Monthly data spanning 2007:06 to 2019:12
and the Gregory-Hansen cointegration method that accounts for structural breaks are used
in the empirical analysis. The adjustment parameters for the standing deposit and lending
facilities are found to be significant, but with a low speed of adjustment. This provides some
evidence on the nature of the interest rate channel of monetary policy transmission in the
country. Furthermore, the study could not confirm asymmetry in the adjustment of retail rates
to their long-run equilibria. Lastly, we find that when the cost of funds rises, following a hike of
the upper bound of the policy rate corridor by the CBN, banks tend to cut costs by reducing
interest expense rather than raising deposit interest rates to aggressively pursue deposit
mobilisation.
Keywords: Discount window operations, Gregory-Hansen cointegration, monetary policy,
standing facilities
JEL Classification: E43, E52, E58

I.

Introduction

M

onetary policy typically uses money and interest rate adjustments to
influence the demand side of an economy in order to attain its objectives.
Understanding the mechanisms by which monetary policy impacts on key
macroeconomic variables is crucial for effective policy design and management.
In Nigeria, monetary policy evolved from a system of direct control, during the earlier
decades of central banking, to a more contemporary system of indirect controls
and operation (Ikhide, 1996). With the adoption of market-based instruments of
monetary policy in 1993, the direct control system gave way to a more marketbased system, the indirect system of control. Instruments used in this system include,
open market operations, complemented by discount window operations and
reserve requirements. The transition from direct control to the indirect system was
aimed at engendering a more robust process of liquidity management that ensures
optimal transmission of monetary policy impulses to the economy.
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Mordi et al. (2019); Abayomi and Sheriffdeen (2015); Ogundipe and Alege (2013),
and Sanusi (2010) highlight the recondite nature of policy rate transmission to banks’
lending rates and deposit rates in Nigeria. Uncertainties around the efficacy of
monetary policy transmission are not peculiar to Nigeria, but a matter of concern
across developing countries (Mishra, Montiel, Pedroni & Spilimbergo, 2014; Mishra &
Montiel, 2012). To strengthen the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
Nigeria, the Central Bank of Nigeria, has over the years, introduced many changes
in the monetary policy operating environment. One of such changes is the
introduction of the monetary policy rate (MPR) in 2006, and the creation of an
interest rate corridor, the standing facilities rates, around the MPR.
The rationale for the corridor system has come under scrutiny, as some analysts
question the social benefits of availing banks with liquidity through the standing
facilities. They point out the possibility of undermining the central bank’s control over
the monetary base, the potential risk of abuse of the policy tool, and the belief that
its effectiveness is weakened by stigma – unwillingness of banks to access the facility
because they may be perceived as being in precarious financial condition (Carlson
& Rose, 2017; Ennis & Price, 2020; Schwartz, 1992; Kaufman, 1992).
Other researchers, on the other hand, opine that standing facilities are useful as they
help to smooth seasonal fluctuations in interest rates and encourage bank lending
by offering a flexible source of liquidity. They also argue that standing facilities can
sufficiently minimise panics in the banking system by mitigating portfolio risk.
Reinforcing the ‘lender-of-last-resort function of the CBN, these facilities prevent a
dry-up of bank liquidity that could follow a surge in deposit withdrawals and
threaten systemic liquidity (Ennis & Klee, 2021; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983).
This debate brings to the fore the importance of an empirical study of the
implications of the standing facilities for bank interest rates. Most studies on
monetary policy transmission utilise minimum rediscount rate (MRR), monetary policy
rate (MPR), money supply and credit to the economy in the analysis of interest rate
pass-through in Nigeria. This paper re-examines the evidence on monetary policy
transmission to bank interest rates in Nigeria, using the standing facilities. In other
words, the paper seeks to provide further evidence on monetary policy transmission
by investigating the influence of standing deposit facility (SDF) and standing lending
facility (SLF) on retail interest rates. Specifically, the paper re-evaluates: (a) the
impact of the CBN standing lending and deposit facilities on the transmission of
monetary policy to deposit and lending rates of Nigerian banks; and (b) how
commercial banks’ retail interest rates respond to MPR adjustments through the
standing facilities.
The paper is broadly organised into six sections. Following the introduction, section
2, provides an overview of monetary policy in Nigeria. Section 3 presents the
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literature review, while section 4 describes the data and methodology. Empirical
results and analytical discussions are presented in section 5, while Section 6
concludes the work.

II.

An Overview of Monetary Policy Operations in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the prime objective of monetary policy is low inflation, which is balanced
against the promotion of economic growth and attainment of full employment
(CBN, 2016; Emefiele, 2019). Prior to the establishment of the CBN, the financial
system was characterised by a laissez-faire banking system. At the inception of the
CBN in 1958, exchange rate targeting was adopted, anchored to the British pound.
Monetary policy focused on guiding developments in the financial sector,
particularly designed to forestall bank failures. However, the civil war of 1967 and
other global developments of that time caused internal economic instability, which
resulted in a switch to the US dollar as the currency peg. The unfolding complexities
during this period led to some amendments, including the enactment of the
Banking decree of 1969 that gave autonomy to the CBN to introduce a range of
monetary instruments.
The first devaluation of the Nigerian currency occurred in 1973, as a result of the
external shocks and the global recession of the early 1970s, which stoked the
agitation for independent and innovative management of the domestic currency
without the influence of the colonial masters. So, the currency was pegged to the
basket of currencies of prime trading partners in 1978. Further to the developments
of the 1970s, oil became the dominant export commodity that increased Nigeria’s
revenue and inadvertently, the money supply of the country. The focus of
policymakers then began to shift from the exchange rate pegging to greater
attention on the control of the money supply. Hence, monetary targeting was
introduced. Pre-established inflation and GDP growth rate were used as
benchmarks for determining the appropriate rate of monetary expansion. The
concern at the time was to ensure that there was balance in the dynamics of
monetary aggregates to tame inflation and quicken sustainable economic growth.
Direct monetary controls (including credit ceilings, administrative control of interest
rates, sectoral credit allocations, and imposition of special deposits, stabilisation
securities, and exchange controls) were used to support the policy framework.
These were to achieve monetary policy objectives and channel bank credit to
preferred sectors under the era of banking sector regulation (1960–1986).
However, the international oil market took a major downturn in the 1980s, resulting
in adverse consequences on the Nigerian economy. This led to the adoption of
austerity embodied in the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was
aimed at cushioning the negative economic impact of the crash in oil prices and
reviving the faltering economy. The introduction of the SAP in 1986 led to the
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deregulation of the financial market (1986–1993). It was alleged that the era of
regulation left a system that was awash with liquidity and that banks were rejecting
deposits as a result (CBN, 1986). SAP opened the gateway for radical policy
adjustments and provided the platform for the initiation and adoption of indirect
monetary controls. With SAP came the mopping of excess liquidity in the system and
allowing interest rates to be market determined. This ushered in a new era through
the deregulation of the financial sector, the removal of credit ceilings and other
controls that characterised the direct monetary policy.
The most significant move in the migration to indirect monetary policy came in June
1993 when the central bank commenced open market operations (OMO),
conducted through outright sales or through repurchase transactions. In addition to
OMO, reserve requirements, which specify the proportion of a bank’s total deposit
liabilities that should be kept with the Central Bank; and discount window
operations, under which the central bank performs the role of lender of last resort to
the deposit money banks, were the other market-based instruments used. With the
indirect monetary policy, CBN adopted the MRR as the nominal anchor for shortterm interest rates in the domestic money market in Nigeria. The MRR was used to
determine lending rates of banks, indicate the policy stance of CBN, promote
efficiency and deepen the nation’s financial system, as well as target money supply.
It was also designed to influence credit, prices, other economic indices, and anchor
expectations.
However, the MRR was not effective in its economic mandate as an anchor rate. Its
effectiveness was limited by factors such as liquidity overhang, oligopolistic banking
sector that created volatility in bank interest rates, and fiscal dominance, which
crowded out private sector credit. Because of these challenges, interest rates were
ineffectively driven by MRR adjustments. Some of the fallouts of deregulation were
a sudden rise in all interest rates and growth in the number of commercial and
merchant banks, prompting the policymakers to opt for guided deregulation from
1993 to 1999. Nonetheless, monetary management, as noted by Nnanna (2001),
had been largely more successful under the indirect control system than the direct
control.
The second wave of deregulation came into effect between 1999 and 2004 with
the banking system becoming incrementally more liberalised than in the era of
guided deregulation. There was more intensified use of the MRR and other marketbased instruments to moderate inflationary pressures. This wave of deregulation saw
banks facing high levels of competition and the extreme struggle for survival amid
low capitalisation. Consequently, CBN introduced reforms to strengthen the capital
base of banks and improve their potential for healthy contribution to the real
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economy. These culminated in the era of banking sector consolidation that started
in 2004.
To address the limitations of the MRR, the monetary policy rate (MPR) was
introduced in December 2006. It was hoped that the rate would calm interest rate
volatility and drive credit toward the private sector. To further ensure stability, the
MPR was used in conjunction with discount window operations and reserve
requirements to define the interest rate corridor that would guide the interest rates
in the domestic money market. In order to ensure a robust operation of the discount
window and provide effective and efficient guidance for the conduct of monetary
operations, especially in the face of the raging global financial crisis, the CBN
expanded its discount window operations in October 2008. The discount window
was expanded to admit sub-national government bonds (including state bonds
and commercial papers) as eligible collateral instruments and to extend the tenor
of liquidity provided under the discount window operations to include structured
facilities with longer maturities of up to 360 days (CBN, 2008). This was hinged on the
expectation that the expansion of the window would engender more robust
processes of injection and absorption of excess liquidity in the money market. In July
2009, the expanded discount window was replaced with the CBN Guarantee of
interbank transactions to encourage banks to lend to one another with ease amid
market frictions, occasioned by the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis.
While the monetary policy in the post-consolidation era continued to be guided by
the objectives of price stability and the overall health of the macro economy, there
was more focus on firming up the gains of the banking sector consolidation.
Therefore, attention was directed to financial deepening, development of the
payment system and promotion of a cash-less economy to ensure that the banking
sector contributes to the real economy, enhancing the supervision of the banking
system, as well as promoting greater financial inclusion. During this era, the MPR
continued to be used as the major instrument of monetary policy, complemented
by other market-based tools.

III.

Literature Review

III.1

Theoretical Literature

The role of interest rates in the transmission of monetary policy impulses in the
economy gained prominence with the Keynesian IS-LM model (Mishkin, 1996).
Within its framework, the effects of monetary expansion on aggregate demand
work through the ability of interest rate changes to alter firms’ investment levels.
Monetary policy anchored on this theory assumes that interest rate is the link
between money and output. However, such a view exposes monetary policy to
certain limitations, such as the liquidity trap, which negates monetary policy. This

6

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and Financial Review

September 2021

limitation became obvious even to Keynes himself, as well as the modern monetary
economists who rejected its tenets (Jhingan, 2003). The alternate view became
known as the portfolio adjustment process.
The modern portfolio adjustment view of monetary policy transmission contends
that central bank actions, such as OMO, will ultimately increase aggregate demand
and expand output through the substitution and wealth effects. Regarding the
substitution effect, if a central bank’s purchase of securities results in excess cash
balances in the hands of the public, they will progressively re-adjust their portfolio of
an asset by substituting the excess balances for other assets whose prices are
unaffected by increased demand. This chain of portfolio re-adjustments will
ultimately impact economic activity by bringing about increases in the output of
capital goods industries (Jhingan, 2003).
The agency cost or the credit rationing theory by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) implies
that interest rates may not always function as an efficient allocator of credits. This
obtains in the face of information asymmetries in financial markets and leads to
credit rationing even if interest rates were liberalised by policy. Thus, banks will rather
ration credit to borrowers instead of pricing them strictly against the signals of
monetary policy when it is too costly to get information about borrowers for loan
administration or monitoring. When this happens, it is implied that the transmission of
monetary policy impulse will be truncated. For an underdeveloped financial market
like Nigeria, where identity management is in its infancy, such a theory may come
close to predicting the prudential behavior of banks in lending to vaguely
identifiable borrowers.
Within the theories of price stickiness in the bank loan market, the switching cost
theory (by Klempere, 1987 cited in Lowe & Rohling, 1992) juxtaposes rational
behaviors of the lender and borrowers to explain why interest rates may be inelastic
to policy rates. In summary, the theory holds that a rational lender will, in order to
cover the cost of acquiring less risky borrowers, impose an up-front fee devised to
keep the borrowers from switching to their competitors. This fee (an extra cost to the
borrowers) adds up with other ‘search’ costs to make the option of switching to
alternative loan suppliers less attractive to borrowers. Therefore, to the extent that
switching costs make loan demand less elastic to interest rate changes, monetary
policy will be less direct in influencing aggregate variables.
The risk-sharing theory further explores price stickiness by considering the often
realistic and observable risk-averse behavior of some loan seekers. This risk aversion
tendency makes them prefer more stably priced interest rate regimes. To
accommodate this preference, banks tend to price loans below the marginal cost
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of funds, while compensating with a higher average rate than obtainable with riskneutral borrowers.
All the above interest rate transmission theories based on the price stickiness
hypothesis hold varying degrees of usefulness in explaining the transmission inertia
documented in the literature. Yet, each must be judged alongside the prevailing
economic structure of the specific monetary authority. Such aspects as the level of
competition in the banking sector, level of financial system development or even
the extent of the central bank’s pursuit of secondary objectives like the economic
development and promotion of protected sectors as in Nigeria, all have an
influence on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.

III.2

Empirical Literature

Bassey et al. (2018) empirically examines the effectiveness of OMO as an instrument
of monetary policy management in Nigeria using the ordinary least squares (OLS)
technique. The study reveals the existence of a significant long-run relationship
between monetary policy instruments –open market operations, cash reserve ratio,
and monetary policy rate– and money supply. They argue that OMO had been an
effective instrument for managing monetary policy in Nigeria and that the monetary
policy rate could serve as a crucial instrument for controlling money supply, and in
general, managing monetary policy effectively in the economy. That position was
echoed by Okaro (2011), who concludes that credit is an important part of the
transmission process of monetary policy in Nigeria.
Sanusi (2010) estimates the magnitude and speed of the pass-through of monetary
policy rate and interbank interest rates to the retail lending and deposit interest rates
in Nigeria, using monthly data and a structural vector auto-regression (SVAR) model.
He also uses a sub-sample analysis to ascertain whether the pass-through of the
policy rate to both retail and market rates has changed after the banking sector
consolidation of 2005 and the introduction of the monetary policy rate in 2006. He
found interest rate pass-through in Nigeria to be incomplete and quite slow with the
pass-through of the monetary policy rate to interbank money market rates was
established being substantially larger and faster than in the retail lending and
deposit rates. Evidence of signaling effects of the policy rate changes on money
market rates was established, but not on retail rates. In addition, the pass-through
to the money market rates increased substantially in the post-consolidation period,
while the pass-through to the retail lending and deposit rates declined relative to
the pre-consolidation period of 2002-2005.
Investigating the pattern of interest rate pass-through (IRPT) and the signaling
effectiveness of monetary policy stance with yearly data (1970-2011) in Nigeria,
Ogundipe and Alege (2013) use maximum likelihood alongside other contemporary
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statistical techniques and found that monetary policy impact on bank retail rates
was sticky downward both in the short and long-run. Similarly, Kelilume (2014)
decompose a sticky policy rate pass-through into short-term and long-term retail
interest rates and found that the effectiveness of monetary policy was confined to
its impact on interbank rates.
Abayomi and Sheriffdeen (2015) find differing outcomes in a study of the IRPT on
commercial banks’ financial products. They documented complete transmission in
the short-run, for most deposit rates, except the 12-month deposit rate. For the
lending rates, the pass-through was complete in the prime lending rate but partial
for the maximum lending rate. Further analyses on its speed showed a mean
adjustment period of sixteen (16) months for deposit rates and seven (7) months for
the prime lending rates to revert to their respective equilibria. The authors
concluded that monetary policy could considerably be used to effectively
influence the short-run interest rates in Nigeria, given that transmission of wholesale
rates to banks’ retail rates is found to be significantly high.
Mordi et al. (2019) document some robust evidence on IRPT in Nigeria. They reported
a long-run relationship between the MPR and the prime lending and savings rates,
despite significant structural breaks in the co-integrating vectors. The study showed
that the transmission of MPR changes to retail rates was not complete and that all
rates (except the savings rate) adjusted symmetrically. This, they argue, suggests
that changes in savings rate depended on the nature of the shock to the policy
rate. Positive shocks in the policy rate were transmitted wholly to the savings rate
within two months vis-à-vis eight months for negative MPR shocks. They further found
that it took about fourteen months for shocks to the policy rate to be passed fully to
the prime lending rate, while the full impact on the 6-months deposit rate took about
eleven (11) months.
Employing the generalised method of moments (GMM) two-step estimator,
Matousek and Solomon (2018) investigate the impact of bank restructuring policies
of the CBN between 2002 and 2008 on bank lending channel of transmission. Using
bank-level data from 23 recapitalised banks, the study revealed that larger and
more capitalised banks were less sensitive to changes in monetary policy. It further
noted that the bank lending channel improved banks’ resilience to monetary
shocks and that the restructuring activities of the CBN helped to improve the impact
of the bank lending channels. Reflecting on the role of central banks in economic
development, Osadume (2018) uses the ordinary least squares, co-integration,
Granger-causality and error correction model to examine how monetary policy rate
and other interest rates affected economic development in Nigeria. He found that
interest rates and monetary policy rates had positive and significant effects on
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economic development in both the short-run and long-run, with fast adjustment
speeds.
Mangwengwende et al. (2011) investigate the link between banking sector
concentration and interest rate pass-through in Botswana, Nigeria, South Africa and
Zambia using monthly data. Applying asymmetric error correction, mean
adjustment lag (MAL) and autoregressive distributed lag models, they presented
some interesting results. Amidst having the lowest banking sector concentration
among the set of countries studied, a cointegration of the deposit and lending rates
was found in Nigeria. In addition, the symmetric error correction for deposit and
lending rates was found to be significant, with the latter adjusting faster than the
former. This result notwithstanding, lending rates adjustment was found not to be
indicative of a relationship with bank concentration levels, which was the lowest.
Furthermore, they reveal that Nigeria’s lowest banking concentration level is neither
related to symmetric and asymmetric response to lending rates, nor to the speed of
symmetric response of deposit rate when above equilibrium and in the short-run.
However, they find that lending rates have the smallest asymmetric long-run
adjustment, which, like the other countries, may be related to the level of banking
sector concentration.
Mishra et al. (2014) use a panel structural VAR model to examine the transmission of
monetary policy to bank lending rates across a large number of countries traversing
advanced economies, emerging market economies and low-income countries.
They found that the response of lending rates to changes in monetary policy varied
widely across countries. Additionally, they noted that the pass-through of monetary
policy among developing countries was generally weaker compared to the rest.
They attribute this to weak institutions and a non-competitive banking environment
that characterise the low-income countries. This corroborates an earlier finding by
Mishra and Montiel (2012) that the transmission of monetary policy is particularly
weak among developing countries.
Anwar and Nguyen (2018) made use of the SVAR method to examine monetary
policy transmission mechanisms in Vietnam. They particularly considered how the
economy responded to shocks in domestic and foreign monetary policy. Their
finding was that the credit channel was important because, among other channels,
it stood out in the propagation of monetary policy in the country. This role, however,
seen via the impact of money supply (M2) on real output, was not as strong as
expected, implying a weak or muted credit channel of monetary policy
transmission. With mixed outcomes as regards credit channel of transmission,
attention may be turned to the interest rate mechanism.
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From the reviewed literature, it is evident that whereas the incompleteness of the
interest rates pass-through of monetary policy in Nigeria has been established, many
of the authors have located the sources of these limitations in either the nature/level
of financial markets or the inherent downward stickiness of retail interest rates. Yet,
one area with potentially significant influence within the monetary policy circle that
was never touched by any of the empirical studies is the role of the standing facilities
in the transmission of monetary policy to bank interest rates. Motivated by the need
to fill the gap this paper estimates the possible pass-through of standing lending and
deposit facilities to retail interest rates in Nigeria.

III.3

Theoretical Framework

Monetary policy under a corridor-operating framework is typified by lending and
deposit windows through which central banks manage reserve requests of the
banking system. The rate of interest in this window is usually kept at a level above
the anchor rate to restrain banks from undue resort to the monetary authority but
instead foster increased inclination towards the interbank market. In the same vein,
the deposit window in the corridor system serves as a medium through which banks
with excess liquidity can lodge such surpluses with the central bank overnight at a
fixed rate of interest. Like the typical discount rate, the deposit rate will normally be
set below the anchor rate to encourage depository corporations to trade their
surplus funds in the interbank market.
With the upper and lower bounds in place, the corridor system is designed to taper
oscillations in the short-term rates. When banks are in need of funds to square up
their statutory reserve balances, they will be discouraged to pay a rate that is more
than the upper bound rate. In the same vein, when in a surplus position, they will
rationally reject rates below the standing deposit rate. Besides, within the corridor,
banks with surpluses and shortages of funds will be motivated to lend to and borrow
from one another resulting in a vibrant interbank market. In this way, the monetary
authority may be able to exercise firm control over the interest rate on short-term
funds. For the banking system, the applicable rate at any point in time will depend
on the liquidity situation.
In Nigeria, the standing facilities window was introduced as a discount window
framework for liquidity management. It comprises two rates: the standing deposit
facility (SDF) rate that is a fixed point below the MPR, and the standing lending
facility (SLF) rate, above the MPR. In a deficit liquidity situation, the CBN will be
injecting liquidity at the SLF rate (upper bound of the policy corridor), and in periods
of excess liquidity, however, the Bank will be draining liquidity from the system at the
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SDF rate (lower bound of the policy corridor).1 In view of this, two sets of effective
policy rates are considered: the SDF rate during liquidity surplus (net liquidity injection
< 0); and the SLF rate during liquidity deficit (net liquidity injection > 0).

IV.

Data and Methodology

Several studies on monetary policy in Nigeria (including Mordi et al. (2019); Okaro
(2011) and Bassey et al. (2018)) have employed the MPR, money supply and credit
to the economy as proxies for monetary policy. This study deviates from the previous
ones by making use of the discount window corridor rates to investigate the
transmission of monetary policy to retail interest rates of deposit money banks.
Having confirmed cointegration of the potential variables in this study, an error
correction model was employed to determine the short-run and long run dynamics.

IV.1

Methodological Framework

In addition to Gregory and Hansen (1996) method that accounts for a structural
break, the study relied largely on the methodological framework for modelling
dichotomous explanatory variables. The framework is appropriate for time series
analysis with seasonality or regime-switching independent variables (Koop, 2013;
Wooldridge, 2016). To ensure the corridor rates fit into the framework, the standing
deposit facility and standing lending facility rates are adjusted by a liquidity
condition dummy, which takes on the values 0 and 1 to align with the mutual
exclusiveness of liquidity surplus and deficit. The adjustment was achieved by taking
the product of each of the standing facility rates and the associated liquidity
condition dummy for each period. By this adjustment, the model will be switching
between the corridor lending and deposit rates according to the prevailing liquidity
condition. We apply a modified version of the framework used by Das (2015) in the
case of India, and incorporate into the long-run model, the standing deposit and
standing lending rates that are adjusted by a liquidity condition dummy as follows:
𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐷𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡− + 𝛽2𝑖𝑡 𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑡 ∗ 𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡+ + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
(1)
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐹 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 > 0
Where:
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡+ = {
during liquidity shortage
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
𝐿𝑖𝑞𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡− = {

1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝐹 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 < 0
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒

during liquidity surplus

The central bank also provides temporary liquidity accommodation to the banks using the repo rate
and withdraws liquidity during surplus conditions using the reverse repo rate. However, this study does not
cover the repo and reverse repo as the focus is on monetary policy operations via the standing facilities.
1
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This ensures the capturing of the effects of policy switches between liquidity
contraction and expansion all through the entire period of the sample, and not
being restricted to the MPR that moves less frequently.
BIR𝑖𝑡 are the different retail interest rates of commercial banks at time t. β𝑖t is a markup for the different interest rates, while 𝛽1𝑖t and β2it capture the transmission effects
of liquidity expansion and contraction through the standing facilities, respectively,
for every specification of retail rates. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the residuals obtained from the various
equations of bank interest rate.

IV.2

Data

The study makes use of monthly data on nine retail interest rates of commercial
banks and the two bounds around the policy corridor. The two standing facility
corridor rates are then adjusted to reflect the applicable or effective policy rates
during periods of shortages and surpluses of liquidity. Net liquidity injection and proxy
for liquidity conditions (surplus or deficit) were derived by taking the differential of
the monthly series of the CBN claims on deposit money banks. An increase in these
claims plausibly indicates the injection of liquidity into the system while a contraction
of the claims points to the opposite. The nine retail rates are: prime lending rate (plr),
maximum lending rate (mlr), savings rate (svr), 7-day time deposit (td7d), the rate
on one-month tenor deposit (td1m), the rate on three-month tenor deposit (td3m),
the rate on six-month tenor deposit (td6m), the rate on twelve-month tenor deposit
(td12m) and time deposit above 12 months (tda12m). The data were sourced from
the CBN’s statistics database with a series spanning 2007:06 to 2019:12. The choice
of this series range is guided by data availability for all the variables.

IV.3

Model Specification

For each of the interest rates, an error correction model is estimated thus:
𝑝

∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑖=1

𝑞
𝐴𝐷𝐽
∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐷𝐹𝑡−1
𝑖=0

𝑞
𝐴𝐷𝐽
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑡−1
+ 𝜑𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡

(2)

𝑖=0

Where SDFADJ is SDF modified by the liquidity condition, SLFADJ is SLF modified by the
liquidity condition, and 𝜑 is a measure of the speed of adjusting back to long-run
equilibrium after a deviation occurred. 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 is a one-period lag of the residuals
from the selected Gregory-Hansen long-run equation for each of the bank interest
rates.
As the usefulness of applied time series is based on the assumption of parameter
constancy, it becomes imperative to adopt a procedure that explicitly checks if
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structural breaks are present in the series; hence, the choice of Gregory-Hansen
cointegration method. The cointegration test with unknown break dates involves
estimating the augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron test statistics for each of
the break points and then picking out the one with minimum values obtained across
all possible break points since this will provide ample grounds for the rejection of the
null hypothesis of no cointegration. Gregory and Hansen (1996) came up with four
models for the test, namely:
(i) Standard model with no structural change:
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝛼 𝑇 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡

(3)

𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑛

Where yit is I(1) and et is I(0), 𝜇 and 𝛼 are the intercept and slope, respectively. To
specify models with structural shifts, a dummy variable is introduced:
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 ≤ [𝑛 𝜏],
𝜃𝑡𝜏 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > [𝑛 𝜏].
Where the unknown parameter 𝜏 ∈ (0,1) is the timing of the point of the break.
(ii) Model with a level shift in which only the intercept shifts:
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝜃𝑡𝜏 + 𝛼 𝑇 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡

𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑛

(4)

Where 𝜇1 is the intercept prior to the break and 𝜇2 is the change in intercept when
the shift occurred.
(iii) Model in which level shifts with trend;
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝜃𝑡𝜏 + 𝛽𝑡 = 𝛼 𝑇 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡

𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑛

(5)

(iv) Model with regime shift in which the slope also shifts.
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝜇1 + 𝜇2 𝜃𝑡𝜏 + 𝛼 𝑇 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝛼 𝑇 𝑦2𝑡 𝜃𝑡𝜏 + 𝑒𝑡

𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑛

(6)

Where 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are as defined in equation (4), 𝛼1 and 𝛼2 the slope before and
after the regime shift respectively.
The best-performing model in terms of fit is then chosen. In this study, model selection
is based on the Akaike information criterion. To account for possible bias from
misspecification due to structural breaks, the vector of residuals from the selected
Gregory-Hansen equation is incorporated into equations (2) and (7) as the error
correction term (ECT).
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To check for asymmetric adjustment, we estimate the following dynamic equation:
𝑝

∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑

𝑞

𝛼𝑖 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡−𝑖 + ∑

𝑖=1

+

𝑞

𝐴𝐷𝐽
𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐷𝐹𝑡−1
+∑

𝑖=0
𝑝𝑜𝑠
𝑛𝑒𝑔
𝜑1 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1 +𝜑2 𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1

𝑖=0

𝐴𝐷𝐽
𝛿𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑡−1

+ 𝜇𝑡
(7)

Where BIR are commercial bank retail rates; SDFADJ and SLFADJ are the standing
deposit facility and standing lending facility rates adjusted by taking the product of
each of them and the associated liquidity condition dummy as explained under
equation (1). This adjustment allows the model to switch between the standing
deposit and lending rates according to the prevailing liquidity condition. ECTpos and
ECTneg are obtained by splitting the residuals from the applicable Gregory-Hansen
specification into positive and negative values corresponding to when they are
above and below their long-run average, respectively.
Estimation of equation (7) yields the error correction coefficients 𝜑1 and 𝜑2 for testing
whether the effects are the same for monetary loosening and tightening. The test
for ascertaining whether the adjustment process is asymmetric or not is executed by
checking the restriction that the adjustment parameters in equation (7) are equal
(Ho: 𝜑1 =𝜑2 ). If the Wald test fails to reject the null, then, we can rule out any
suggestion of asymmetry.
A note on the implications of changes in SLF and SDF may be apt at this point, an
increase in SLF implies an increase in the cost of funds from the CBN source. This can
have a positive or negative impact on banks’ interest rates. When there is an
increase in the cost of funds from CBN, banks may try to save costs by reducing
interest rates paid on different tenures of their deposit products. In this case, we
expect the effect of an increase in SLF on the deposit rate to be negative. If,
however, an increase in SLF drives banks to resort to the alternative of aggressive
deposit mobilisation by offering high interest rates to depositors, the effect of an
increase in SLF on deposit rates as well as on lending rates will be positive. Therefore,
while the long-run effect of an increase in SLF on banks’ lending rates will be positive,
the effect on deposit rates will depend on which one dominates the desire for cost
reduction versus the desire for aggressive deposit mobilisation.
Furthermore, an increase in SDF implies a heightened desire to mop up liquidity. In
other words, an increase in SDF is an incentive for banks to deposit at the central
bank, thereby reducing the amount of liquidity in the system. This happens mostly
during persistent liquidity overhangs. During this period, bank interest rates,
especially on deposits, tend to fall naturally. Since the cost of funds sourced from
CBN and the cost of funds sourced by deposit mobilisation both fall in periods of
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excess liquidity, we expect the effect of an increase in SDF on banks’ interest rates
to be negative in the long-run.

IV.4

Estimation Procedure

First, we check the statistical properties of the variables. Thereafter, we conduct a
single equation test for cointegration using the Gregory and Hansen (1996)
algorithm. Following the cointegration test, an error correction model is estimated
for the bank interest rates as specified in equation (2). Test for the existence of
asymmetric adjustment follows the approach used by Scholnick (1996), which was
also applied by Das (2015) and Mordi et al. (2019). The equilibrium condition
between the bank interest rate and policy rates is defined as the mean of the
residual series from the cointegrating equation. The approach involves splitting the
residuals from equation (1) into their positive (ECTpos) and negative (ECTneg) values
which correspond to when the residuals are above and below their long-run
average, respectively, as specified in equation (7).

V.

Results and Discussion

The main findings are presented in this section.

V.1

Unit Root Tests

As part of the pre-estimation diagnostics, the time series properties of the variables
were examined using standard statistical and econometric tests. The order of
integration of each variable is checked with the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
test. The results show that each of the eleven variables is integrated of order one, at
the 5.0 per cent level of significance, and are therefore differenced once to
achieve stationarity (Table 1).
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Table 1: Results of Stationarity Tests
1st
Level
p-value
Difference
p-value

September 2021
Order of
Integration

sdfadj

-1.743463

0.4072

-21.62629

0.0000

I(1)

slfadj

-2.262155

0.1858

-21.60497

0.0000

I(1)

Mlr

-1.443604

0.5592

-4.077640

0.0014

I(1)

Plr

-2.091192

0.2486

-3.413829

0.0120

I(1)

Svr

-0.755810

0.8279

-6.132546

0.0000

I(1)

td7d

-1.791244

0.3837

-3.308107

0.0163

I(1)

td1m

-2.147397

0.2267

-3.106170

0.0283

I(1)

td3m

-2.188975

0.2112

-4.742910

0.0001

I(1)

td6m

-2.180099

0.2145

-3.546302

0.0081

I(1)

td12m

-2.308206

0.1708

-3.160517

0.0245

I(1)

tda12m

-2.037227

0.2708

-16.76165

0.0000

I(1)

Source: Authors’ compilation.

V.2

Cointegration Test

The Gregory-Hansen residual-based cointegration test was used to determine the
long-run relationship between corridor rates and selected retail rates, and also
resolve biases derivable from structural breaks (see section IV.2).
The results of the tests, which are presented in Table 2, indicate that at the 5.0 per
cent level of significance, the policy rates are cointegrated with a 7-day time
deposit, 1-month time deposit, 3-month time deposit, 12-month time deposit and
time deposit above 12 months. This implies that the error correction approach can
be applied to examine the long-run relationships between the standing facility rates
and interest rates of banks. As further shown in the table, structural breaks occurred
in February 2010 for the 7-day time deposit and March 2010 for the other four
variables. The breaks occurred during the period of re-emergence of liquidity surfeit
in the banking system after the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, which prompted
the CBN to change from monetary easing to a tightening stance in September 2010.
The test statistics, however, did not indicate any long-run relationship between the
policy rates and maximum lending rate, prime lending rate, saving rate and 6month time deposit. As shown in Table 2, the computed ADF or Z-statistics are larger
than their critical values at the 5.0 per cent level of significance. Therefore, these
variables cannot be carried along in the error correction model estimations.
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Table 2: Results of Gregory-Hansen Cointegration Tests

mlr

plr

svr

td7d

td1m

td3m

td6m

td12m

tda12m
5% crit. Values

Statistics

intercept shift

intercept shift with
trend

intercept and
slope shift

ADF t-stat

-3.557453

-3.872139

-3.681776

Break date

2016M06

2011M04

2015M11

AIC

-4.566523

-6.21864

-4.546727

ADF t-stat

-3.515419

-3.411952

-3.39585

Break date

2009M08

2009M07

2015M07

AIC

-6.218095

-6.212207

-6.242201

ADF t-stat

-4.010619

-3.912805

-4.507788

Break date

2013M10

2010M08

2013M10

AIC

-6.725381

-7.005925

-6.7056

Za-stat

-51.20868**

-52.17658

-54.54624

Break date

2010M02

2010M03

2010M02

AIC

-5.859161

-5.988142

-5.836561

Za-stat

-56.05271

-65.6814**

-62.60071

Break date

2010M03

2010M03

2010M03

AIC

-4.723161

-4.751063

-4.701479

Za-stat

-52.8912

-56.34552**

-57.52493

Break date

2010M03

2010M03

2010M03

AIC

-4.832387

-4.861392

-4.814729

ADF t-stat

-3.512944

-5.265278

-5.311011

Break date

2010M06

2010M05

2010M05

AIC

-4.531669

-4.525363

-4.509146

Za-stat

-39.8476

-54.50849**

-43.03647

Break date

2010M03

2010M03

2010M03

AIC

-4.325258

-4.31434

-4.301011

Za-stat

-76.54178

-80.92498**

-84.01182

Break date

2010M03

2010M03

2010M06

AIC

-4.632225

-4.744413

-4.607116

ADF t-stat

-4.92

-5.29

-5.50

Za-stat

-46.98

-53.92

-58.33

Source: Authors’ compilation.

V.3

The Long-Run Models

Of the five retail rates estimated, the long-run coefficients for three of them (1-month
time deposit, 3-month time deposit and time deposit above 12 months) are
negative and significant. The coefficient for another one of the five rates (7-day
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time deposit) is also negative but only significant at 10.0 per cent, while that of the
fifth rate (12-month time deposit) is negative but not statistically significant (Table 3).
The consistent negative coefficients for the SDF for all the rates is congruent with a
priori expectation as bank interest rates tend to fall generally when the SDF rises in
accord with CBN’s intention to mop up during liquidity surplus. Furthermore, as
shown by the negative coefficients of the SLF, the results indicate that the higher
cost of CBN-sourced funds is associated with a fall in deposit rates of banks. The
implication, therefore, is that banks’ desire to save costs by lowering deposit rates
dominates over their desire for aggressive deposit mobilisation in periods of tight
liquidity. In other words, banks are more inclined to cutting costs during tight liquidity
than offering higher interests to attract more deposits. This is a key finding of this
study.
Table 3: Result of Long-Run Equations
Bank int. rates
td1m
td3m
td7d
td12m
tda12m

Policy rates
SDF
SLF
SDF
SLF
SDF
SLF
SDF
SLF
SDF
SLF

Coefficients
-0.190718***
-0.104806**
-0.155479**
-0.083856**
-0.066430*

Probability
0.0061
0.0133
0.0180
0.0363
0.0927

-0.044042*
-0.093362
-0.024640
-0.258339***
-0.134240***

0.0681
0.2840
0.6427
0.0005
0.0032

***, ** and * imply significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Source: Authors’ compilation.

V.4

Error Correction Models

The estimated coefficients of the error correction term (ECT) for the five interest rates
are negative and significant at the 5.0 per cent level, signifying the existence of
long-run convergence between the lower and upper bounds of the policy corridor
and each of the five variables. The magnitudes of the coefficients of the error
correction term appear to be clearly suggestive of a rather weak speed of
adjustment of the retail rates to their long-run equilibria. At -0.06 and -0.18, the
slowest and fastest speeds of adjustment were seen in the models for 3-month time
deposits and time deposits above 12 months, respectively. These imply that about
6.18 per cent and 17.65 per cent of the deviations or errors are corrected within a
period of one month for a 3-month time deposit and time deposit above 12 months,
respectively. The speeds of adjustment for other rates lie between these two ends.
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Table 4: Speed of adjustment
Bank int. rates

ECT coefficients

Probability

td1m

-0.067111

0.0373

td3m

-0.061760

0.0299

td7d

-0.064326

0.0410

td12m
tda12m

-0.091703
-0.176467

0.0348
0.0111

Source: Authors’ compilation.

V.5

Asymmetric Adjustment

The results of the asymmetric error correction model show the response of retail
interest rates to MPR movements via the standing facilities. The equality of
adjustments of the interest rates to shifts in policy was tested using the Wald test. The
results presented in Table 5 show homogeny in the adjustment of all the retail rates
(whether they are low or high compared with their equilibrium) to the standing
facility corridor rates. In other words, the null hypothesis that the parameters 𝜑1 and
𝜑2 are equal was not rejected for each of the five retail rates, meaning there was
no asymmetry in the adjustment process of bank deposit rates to shifts in the SDF
and SLF.
Table 5: Results of Tests for Asymmetric Adjustment
Bank interest rate
td1m
td3m
td7d
td12m
tda12m

Coefficients
𝜑1
𝜑2
-0.096632*
-0.063950
-0.104529*
-0.030493
-0.130475**
-0.016086
-0.192243**
0.011918
-0.158270
-0.229298*

Wald test: 𝜑1 =𝜑2
χ2
Probability
0.192413
0.6609
0.814296
0.3669
1.598820
0.2061
2.077600
0.1495
0.111252
0.7387

***, **, * imply significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively
Source: Authors’ compilation from Eviews 9 output.

V.6

Post-Estimation Diagnostics

Some post-estimation diagnostics were carried out to determine the health of the
models. Serial correlation, heteroscedasticity, residual normality and parameter
stability were checked using Breusch-Godfrey, White, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, and
CUSUM tests, respectively. There were no serial correlations detected in the five
models. Furthermore, all the models were dynamically stable as evidenced by the
CUSUM test. However, heteroskedasticity was detected only in the equation for a 1month time deposit (which was corrected using the Huber-White covariance
method), while residual normality concerns were seen in all the models.
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In large sample studies, residual normality concern is not a threat since the leastsquares estimators of the parameter and variance are still consistent. They converge
to their true values and are still useful for implementing tests and inferences. The tstatistic will be asymptotically normally distributed when error normality does not
take place (Wooldridge, 2016; Greene, 2012). Therefore, we can say our models are
reasonably adequate for this study.
Table 6: Post-estimation diagnostics
Variable

Issue
Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity
Normality
Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity
Normality
Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity
Normality
Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity
Normality
Serial Correlation
Heteroskedasticity
Normality

td7d

td1m

td3m

td12m

tda12m

Statistic
1.030704
26.13158
33.35756
0.638771
114.2048
360.3113
0.072064
35.48127
52.62421
0.907849
27.61572
29.37539
2.364548
38.99800
301.4893

Probability
0.5973
0.1615
0.0000
0.7266
0.0000
0.0000
0.9646
0.1271
0.0000
0.6351
0.1188
0.00000
0.3066
0.0634
0.0000

Remark
No Serial Correlation
Not Heteroskedastic
Non Normal Residuals
No Serial Correlation
Heteroskedastic
Non Normal Residuals
No Serial Correlation
Not Heteroskedastic
Non Normal Residuals
No Serial Correlation
Not Heteroskedastic
Non Normal Residuals
No Serial Correlation
Not Heteroskedastic
Non Normal Residuals

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Figure 1: Stability Diagnostics
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V.7

Robustness Checks

For robustness checks, three variables are included and estimated in another model
(equation 8) to control for other factors that influence commercial bank interest
rates apart from the standing facility rates. Such factors may include regulatory
thresholds and other elements that reflect activities in the interbank market. Hence,
private sector cash reserve requirements (CRR), inter-bank call rate (IBC) and open
buy-back rate (OBB) were selected as the control variables.

𝑝

𝑞

∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖 ∆𝐵𝐼𝑅𝑡−𝑖 +
𝑖=1
𝑃

𝑞

𝐴𝐷𝐽
∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐷𝐹𝑡−1
𝑖=0
𝑃

𝑃

𝐴𝐷𝐽
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑖 ∆𝑆𝐿𝐹𝑡−1
+ ∑ 𝜌𝑖 ∆𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡−𝑖
𝑖=0

𝑖=1

+ ∑ 𝜔𝑖 ∆𝐼𝐵𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜉𝑖 ∆𝑂𝐵𝐵𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜑𝐸𝐶𝑇𝑡−1
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

+ 𝜇𝑡

(8)

The results of equation (8) are presented in Table 7.

Table 7: Speed of adjustment
(model with control variables)
Bank int. rates

ECT coefficients

Probability

td1m

-0.033402

0.0279

td3m

-0.072240

0.0147

td7d

-0.073208

0.0302

td12m

-0.094958

0.0308

tda12m

-0.135618

0.0372

Source: Authors’ compilation.

The results confirm the validity of the earlier results. The estimated coefficients of the
error correction term (ECT) for bank interest rates are negative and significant at the
5.0 per cent level even when control variables are included in the model. This implies
that long-run convergence exists between the standing facility rates and each of
the retail rates. From a minimum of about -0.03 for a one-month time deposit to
about -0.14 for time deposits above 12 months, the speeds of adjustment range from
3.34 to 13.56 per cent per month across the five retail rates, indicating a slow speed
of reverting to their long-run equilibria.
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Conclusion

In this paper, we examined interest rate pass-through from the perspective of the
discount window operations using monthly data from 2007:06 to 2019:12. The
cointegration tests based on Gregory and Hansen (1996) show that just five of the
nine interest rates examined have long-run relationships with the standing deposit
facility and standing lending facility rates, with structural breaks occurring around
2010:M02 and 2010:M03 in all the relationships.
The influence of the structural breaks is therefore built into the error correction model
estimated for each bank retail interest rate. For each of the five variables that have
a long-run relationship with the standing facilities, we estimate the long-term interest
rate pass-through and examine how they adjust to monetary policy impulses
through the policy corridor rates of the CBN. We found these to be significant but
with slow speeds of adjustment. Accommodating structural breaks in our modelling
approach, we also found no asymmetry in the adjustment process of retail rates to
their long-run equilibria. However, adjustment speed analyses suggest sluggish
transmission of changes in the standing facility rates to the five rates as well as a slow
reversion to equilibrium.
Furthermore, there exists a long-run relationship between the standing deposit and
lending facilities on one hand, and five deposit rates (7-day time deposit, 1-month
time deposit, 3-month time deposit, 12-month time deposit and time deposit above
12 months) on the other. We also delineated a weak pass-through of the policy rates
to the retail interest rates of commercial banks. The observed slow pass-through is
largely in line with the results of many previous studies on the subject such as Mordi
et al. (2019) and Sanusi (2010). The implication is that monetary policy transmission
through the interest rate channel is not very strong in Nigeria. Therefore, factors other
than the market as currently constituted may have an overwhelming influence on
retail interest rates in Nigeria. Finally, we found an inverse adjustment of the deposit
rates to changes in the standing lending facility. The implication of this is that, when
the cost of funds rises due to a higher standing lending facility rate, banks’ desire to
reduce interest expense outweighs the inclination for aggressive deposit
mobilisation via higher deposit interest rates.
Therefore, there is a need for greater efforts toward further development of the
money market in Nigeria to enhance its sensitivity to monetary policy signals. There
is also the need for cautious investigation of possible non-market factors that could
be affecting the efficacy of monetary policy transmission.
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